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2 
Introduction 
"Peace is the skillful management of conflict."  
- Kenneth Boulding 
 
Conflict mediation is a fairly new topic in international relations, which is surprising 
considering that this phenomenon is probably as old as humanity. Conflict mediation is a form of 
conflict management where a third party is involved to help solve crises. Mediation is a well-
suited instrument for conflict management, mainly because it lets all parties keep their 
independence. Mediation is voluntary and the disputant parties can choose their own mediator. 
Furthermore mediation has little financial costs when compared to the costs of peacekeeping 
operations or  humanitarian assistance for example (Bercovitch 1991, 3). Moreover, mediation is 
a flexible, based on consensus and autonomous decision-making (Bercovitch et al. 1991, 3). 
Conflict mediation aims at starting a dialogue between disputing parties and ultimately at 
conflict resolution. To achieve this goal mediation uses negotiations, resorts to the reason and 
logic of both parties and, ultimately, appeals to the common wish to end violence and prevent its 
recurrence (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014, 2). 
Multiple kinds of actors can be selected to mediate a specific conflict. The type of mediator 
is of influence to the outcome of the mediation process, but there is no ideal type of mediator 
since different types of conflicts require different types of mediators. The more traditional actors 
in conflict mediation are states or international institutions. For instance the United States (US) 
and Norway have mediated in many peace talks as state actors and the United nations (UN) or 
the NATO have been active as interstate actors in conflict mediation. These types of mediators 
have a lot to offer in the mediation process because they generally have much experience, have 
the resources to finance and facilitate the peace talks and have some form of leverage to hold 
over the disputant parties to ensure their compliance in the process. Over the past decades non-
state actors have also increasingly taken part in conflict mediation (for example: Bennet 2002, 
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402: Aall 2007, 122). Examples of non-state actors active in this area are Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), private companies, influential individuals or religious actors. This thesis 
will focus on the latter: faith-based mediators. Religion is often a source of conflict and can form 
a deeply rooted cleavage in society, but can also help ending conflicts and bring reconciliation 
(Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009, 176: Little and Applebee 2004, 2).  Religion is an 
important part of the cultural identity of individuals, organizations or states. Religious actors can 
play a big variety of roles in a conflict: “changing attitudes, education, healing trauma, 
disseminating ideas such as democracy and human rights, drafting committed people to do 
peace work, challenging traditional structures that perpetuate violence, mediation, reaching out 
to governments to promote peace building, encouraging disarmament, training in conflict 
resolution and prevention, humanitarian aid and relief” (Bercovich and Kadayifci-Orellana 
2009).  Religious actors can therefore influence conflicts impacting the conflict causes, dynamic 
and resolution (Abu-Nimer 2001, 685).  Non-state mediators in general and religious mediators 
in particular have different assets than  state or interstate mediators. Whereas the latter 
mediators are more powerful and have many resources, non-state actors are generally less 
biased and trustworthy. Moreover, religious mediators can have a spiritual leverage as they are 
often respected by the disputant parties, especially in traditional religious societies (Bercovitch 
and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009, 177).  
Although much research has been done on interstate or state actors as mediators, non-
governmental actors have been under-analyzed.  Faith-based and religious mediators are even 
less researched, therefore this thesis will focus on this type of mediator. To further narrow it 
down and create a comprehensive research, this thesis will concentrate on religious 
organizations. Examples of religious organizations include clergy, private religious organizations 
or ad-hoc religious institutions. To gain insight in the role of religious actors in conflict 
mediation I will analyze one specific organization: the Community of Sant’Egidio. This catholic 
organization of lay people has mediated many conflicts since the 1990s. The first –and most 
successful- conflict that Sant’Egidio mediated was the civil war in Mozambique, which will be the 
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first conflict case used. To compare the role of Sant’Egidio and the success of the mediation 
process another case is needed. This second case will be the war in Kosovo, and the negotiations 
about the education problems at the time in particular. Even though the negotiations between 
the two disputant parties in Kosovo were not centered on reaching peace, the mediation process 
and role of Sant’Egidio makes it suited for comparison with the Mozambican case. In order to say 
something about the role and assess if the mediation process was a success I will analyze seven 
different factors. All these factors are proved to be influential in the mediation process: the 
nature of the conflict; characteristics of the disputing parties and the motivation, bias, strategy 
and leverage of the mediator. 
The thesis is composed as follows. First the theoretical framework will be set out, giving 
the necessary information about conflict mediation in general and faith-based mediation in 
particular. From this information the factors for my analysis will be deducted, which will be 
further constructed in the following chapter on methodology. In this chapter the sources used 
for this thesis will also be described and the variable further explained to set out the research 
design. The next chapter is centered around the Community of Sant’Egidio. It gives background 
information about this organization and puts it in a broader perspective by comparison with 
other faith-based organizations. Then the empirical chapters begin, starting with an analysis of 
Sant’Egidio’s role in the conflict mediation to end Mozambique’s war. First the background of the 
conflict is explained, then the mediation process is described and finally the role of SAnt’Egidio 
in this process is analyzed. The next chapter on Kosovo follows the same structure, with the 
difference that the negotiations led by Sant’Egidio did not form the end of the war. To conclude 
the thesis, both cases will be compared to answer the following research question: 
What is the role of religious organizations in conflict mediation? 
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Theory 
Factors influencing mediation success  
Conflict mediation has been defined in many ways, but most scholars now use the 
definition from Bercovitch et al. (1991, 8) who describe the concept as a “process of conflict 
management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an 
individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences 
without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law”.  As written above, the 
third party becomes an addition to the dyadic relationship of the disputing parties. A conflict can 
be resolved by external actors in many ways: military, economically by imposing financial 
sanctions, and diplomatically by  using various forms of negotiation or involvement in a binding 
or non-binding fashion. According to Bercovitch et al. (1991) mediation is used when disputes 
are long, drawn out and complex; the disputants' own conflict management efforts did not lead 
to a solution; both sides want to avoid the further costs of conflict, and the disputants are 
prepared to break their stalemate by cooperating with each other and engaging in some 
communication and contact. There are two main forms in which outsiders can get involved in a 
conflict. One is via legalistic-normative procedures, in which a third party imposes explicit ruling 
or judgment on the disputing parties. The form of mediation I will investigate is solely involving 
voluntary procedures, which help parties abate, settle or resolve a conflict using different – but 
no coercive-  strategies (Bercovitch 1991, 4).   
The role that mediators take is context and mode specific (Bercovitch 1991). There are 
many different strategies which fit different kinds of conflicts. Most scholars work with a scale 
that ranges to a very passive stance in the mediation process, to a very active (manipulative) 
stance. That is to say, from descriptive/reflective behavior  to prescriptive/directive behavior 
(for example Bercovitch et al. 1991; Kleiboer 1996). Beardsley et al. divides the strategies  into 
three categories. The first one is facilitation, which means providing good offices and possibly 
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expanding this by assisting extensively in the communication between the parties. This can 
mean a  simplification of communication, a clarification of the respective positions of the parties, 
and issue reconceptualization (see also: Vukovic 2012, 20). Potential benefits of this strategy is a 
focus on sustaining the dialogue between the disputants which is a difficult t part of the process. 
The second strategy is formulation, in which the mediator expands its role by contributing 
substantively in the negotiations for instance in conceiving and proposing new solutions to the 
disputing parties and structuring the negotiations. Using the formulative strategy, the mediator 
acts not only as a facilitator but also a coordinator. The most active role is that of manipulation 
where the mediator uses its position and leverage in the mediation process. This strategy can 
have a large impact on the disputants and helps reaching an agreement quickly, but that often 
comes with high costs. It should also be noted that mediators mostly use a combination of 
strategies and these three categories are more like a spectrum. To put in another way, mediators 
always have to use facilitation to begin formulation or manipulation (Beardsley et al. 2006 63-
64). Scholars have conducted some empirical studies to find which strategy is most successful, 
but outcomes are very diverse. Wilkenfield et al. (2003) find that the strategy of manipulation 
yields the best results, and Bercovitch et al. (1991, 6) also conclude that more active strategies 
have a higher success rate.  Beardsley et al. (2006, 83) find that manipulation has the strongest 
effect on the likelihood of reaching a formal agreement, but facilitation has the greatest influence 
on lasting tension reduction. They conclude that a balance of styles is the best chance of a 
successful conflict resolution. Furthermore, post-mediation is important in the process of 
conflict resolution (Beardsley 2008).  
There are many factors which have proved to be influential on the mediation success, and 
a lot of them are dependent on the mediator. Touval (1982) identifies various key attributes of a 
successful mediator: having influence with disputants, serving as communicator, helping identify 
areas of common interest and working on enlarging that common interest. Rubin (1992, 251) 
writes about three main requirements: disputant motivation, mediator opportunity and 
mediator skill. First, the motivation of mediators seem to have an impact. It has been argued that 
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states are more restrictive than organizations when choosing in which conflicts to be involved 
(Melin and Svensson 2009; Frei1976; Bercovitch and Jackson 1997). This is possibly caused by 
the fact that states also use mediation as foreign policy and belongs in the field op politics and 
strategic behavior (Touval 2003). Mediators can have humanitarian, ideological or spiritual 
motivations, but can also be motivated by a personal agenda. Examples of the agenda of certain 
mediators can include economic incentives, but also stabilizing its own state or region.  
An important question in the field of conflict mediation, as well as in this thesis, is 
mediator bias. Conventional standpoints highlighted the mediators impartiality as crucial 
(Assefa 1987, Miall 1992, Hume 1994). It is argued that a mediator needs to be neutral to build 
trust and receive confidence in the mediator. This traditional approach has been challenged by 
numerous scholars. Bercovitch et al. (1991) for example claim that a mediator inherently 
exercises influence in its role as mediator and can therefore not be impartial. A biased mediator 
can also be an attractive option if it has ties to the party with the greatest control over the 
conflicts’ outcome. History has moreover shown multiple examples of conflict resolution 
brought by a biased mediator (Kleiboer 1996). Some scholars emphasize the importance of the 
trust-based mediator but argue that this is not related to impartiality. From the research of 
Wehr and Lederach (1991, 85-98) the ‘insider-partial’ is preferred over the outsider-neutral’. 
Especially in more traditional settings, a mediator from within the conflict that builds on 
connectedness and trusted relationships with the conflict parties is preferred over a mediator 
who operates on distance and objectivity (Kleiboer 1996).  
Some of the mediation literature claims that the mediator’s leverage and resources are far 
more important in accounting for success of mediation than impartiality (Bercovitch et al 1991; 
Touval and Zartman 1985; Brookmire and Sistrunk 1980; Wallensteen and Svensson 2014). 
Leverage is the mediator’s ability to put pressure on one or both the conflicting parties to accept 
a settlement of the conflict. Leverage is strongly related to status and resources (Kleiboer 1996). 
Frei (1976) has proven the importance of these factors by finding that mediation by 
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superpowers has been more successful than mediation by less powerful actors. Kleiboer (1996) 
states that there is a relationship between leverage and impartiality. Neutral mediators’ lack of 
leverage is important (trust-based mediators), whereas partial mediators need leverage to 
succeed (power-based mediators).  
The success of the mediation process is not only depending on the mediator, of great 
influence are the disputing parties themselves. They have to be willing to start a mediation 
process, which they will only do when they perceive it to work in favor of their interests. In 
other words, when the benefits of an agreement will be greater than the benefits of continuing 
the conflict. Zartman and Touval (1996, 446) state following: “their [the mediator’s] first 
diplomatic effort must be to convince the parties of the values of their services before mediation 
can get started”. Adding to that, Melin and Svensson (2009)  show that the willingness to accept 
a mediator  is significantly smaller in civil wars compared to interstate conflict because in the 
latter case the sovereign state has to make recognition costs. Also of importance is the relative 
power of the disputing parties, mediation has a higher success rate when there is not much 
power disparity. Furthermore the previous relationship of the parties is important; the more 
friendly the relationship before the conflict was, the more likely the conflict will be resolved 
(Bercovitch et al 1991). 
Aside from the characteristics of the disputant parties and the mediator, the nature of the 
conflict is of high importance in the mediation process. Every conflict has many different actors, 
dimensions and historical happenings that influence the success of conflict mediation process. 
Moreover, the duration of the conflict seems to be correlating with the success rate of mediation 
and peacemaking. Thus the nature of the dispute is also a significant factor in the chance of 
mediation success. Bercovitch et al (1991) found that the duration, intensity and kind of issues 
involved are highly influential for mediation outcome. Timing is important, but when best to 
start with the mediation process depends on the conflict. Also, the success rate increases at the 
second or third attempts at mediation. The lower the intensity of the conflict is, the more likely 
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the disputing parties are willing to accept mediation and resolve the conflict. Disputes involving 
territory of security have a greater chance of resolution than conflicts over issues of ideology 
and independence (Bercovitch et al. 1991, 12-13).   
There does not exist much consensus among the literature among conflict mediation. All 
conflicts are different and it does not seem that one particular strategy has the highest results. 
Moreover there also is magic recipe for a mediator and the attributes it should have. In some 
cases a neutral, weak mediator works best, whereas in other cases the biased powerful mediator 
is successful. What can be concluded from the research that has been done on this subject is that 
certain factors seem to be influencing the outcome of the mediation process. Firstly the profile of 
the mediator is important. This can be divided in: the motivation, bias, leverage and resources of 
the mediator. Also the strategy it uses is of importance for the outcome of the mediation process. 
Then more generally, the profile and characteristics of the disputing parties as well as the 
general nature of the conflict are influential for the outcome of the peace process. 
Aspects of religious actors 
What is of interest for this thesis is what sets the religious mediator apart from other 
mediators. Are faith-based mediators more advanced in certain factors influencing mediation 
success? There has been done very little previous research on the effect of the mediator being a 
religious actor on the mediation outcome. Religious organization will be defined as 
organizations who are motivated and inspired by their spiritual and religious traditions, 
principles, and values to undertake peace work. They use their spiritual leverage, religious 
identity and values, and even religious texts or rituals during the mediation process (Bercovich 
and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009).  Research has shown that ‘unofficial’ religious actors have been 
more successful in bringing the conflicted parties together and to mediate a successful outcome 
(Little and Applebee 2004, 11). The strong assets of religious mediators are being more trusted, 
credible and legitimate to the parties compared to other more powerful mediators. They are 
long-term players who have a close connection with the people involved in the conflict (Little 
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and Applebee 2004, 3: Bercovich and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009, 176: Bartoli 2004).  Faith-based 
actors can employ almost every strategy in the spectrum mentioned before, from taking a more 
communicative role, to more using more directive strategies to help parties reach an agreement. 
They often take a synergetic approach and emphasize the creation of a dialogue (Little and 
Applebee 2004: Bercovich and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009). Since trustworthiness is their biggest 
asset and adds to their legitimacy as a mediator, it is important that religious mediators remain 
as unbiased as possible (Little and Applebee 2004, 12). Regarding motivation, religious actors 
are generally morally and spiritually motivated to mediate a conflict (Bercovich and Kadayifci-
Orellana 2009). Also, in the case of a domestic conflict, the local religious leaders often times 
stand up for the civil society and try to influence the government for reforms and protections of 
the population. The motivation for opposing conflicts stem from religious traditions 
emphasizing peace and justice (Scott and Applebee 2004, 7, 10). Religious mediators usually do 
not have leverage over the disputants in an economic of military way. They could have a 
spiritual and moral leverage over the parties however and hereby  bring social, moral and 
spiritual resources to the peace building process. Adding to these spiritual resources, religious 
actors often have sufficient time available, and are able to attain financial resources from a large 
religious community. Also, in many cases they have big international networks (Abu-nimer 2001; 
Bercovich and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009). To conclude the scarce literature on religious 
mediators, Bartoli (2004) argues that these aspects make faith-based mediators successful: they 
have an intimate knowledge of the language and culture of the population, they receive direct 
inside information during the conflict, the possess direct or indirect political expertise and they 
can help to create a long-term vision of peace for the society.   
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Methodology 
Variables 
The broad independent variable in this thesis are the religious organizations. As defined 
before, these are organizations that are motivated or organized around religion or spirituality. 
Religious organizations can be local, regional, national or international organizations. 
Furthermore, religious organization can be centered on multiple religions, on one ‘broad’ 
religion (like Christianity of Islam), or on a religious denomination (like shi’ism or 
Protestantism). For the research in general it would be best if multiple types of religious 
organizations would be analyzed and compared, but researching this one type will give 
important insights in  the research question. The case used in this thesis is a international 
Catholic organization. 
The dependent variable in this study is conflict mediation success. Mediation success has 
been defined in many different ways. The best possible outcome of a mediation process is a 
longstanding peace agreement. Many scholars therefore have used a formal peace agreement as 
their definition of success or dependent variable (for example Beardsley et al., 2006; Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson & Wille, 1991). Yet, a temporary ending to violent conflict has also been used by 
researchers to clarify the mediation process as successful (Regan & Stam, 2000; Gelpi, 1999). 
Some researchers however argue that starting the process of peace negotiations can be defined 
as success of the mediator (Frei 1976, 69). I believe that these three outcomes can all be 
considered as successful mediation outcomes and will therefore use all three of these definitions 
as a sort of spectrum. The starting of the negotiations is the lowest stage of success, the ending of 
violence is considered more successful and a formal peace agreement most successful. 
Furthermore there is a difference between long-term and short-term success, if the agreement is 
not implemented or if violence returns, the case will be considered less successful. The cases will 
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be evaluated across these concepts of mediation success to define the role of the religious 
organization in the mediation process. 
Research design 
In order to answer the research question a comparative case study will be conducted. 
There are a limited number of examples of religious actors in conflict mediation. One is the Inter 
Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL), its mediation efforts were instrumental in the 
negotiation and signing of the Lome Peace Agreement. Quaker involvement during the Nigerian 
Civil War in 1967 is another example where the religious identity of the mediator had a 
significant impact on the mediation process (Bercovich and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009). For this 
thesis one institutional case will be analyzed: the Community of  Sant‘Egidio. This Catholic 
organization of lay people has been active in  the mediation process in multiple intra-national 
conflicts, which makes comparison between these conflicts possible. The following chapter will 
explain more thoroughly why Sant’Egidio is well suited for this study. The conflict cases that will 
be researched are the civil war in Mozambique and the education issue within the broader 
conflict in Kosovo.  
Data 
This research will be a literature study mainly dependent on secondary data, but these will 
be supplemented with primary data. To give an overview of Sant’Egidio, aside from the existing 
scientific literature, some general information of its own website is used.  Added to that are 
some interviews with the leader of Sant’Egidio – Andrea Riccardi- that have been published 
online. These direct sources coming from Sant’Egidio and its members will be used to analyze 
the motivation and strategy of this organization. Sources that can be used to analyze the 
mediation process form a greater obstacle, since the negotiations are conducted in secret. In the 
case of Mozambique however, there are some first-hand accounts published of the mediation 
process. The first source is the website of Sant’Egidio and interviews with its president Andrea 
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Riccardi, who was one of the mediators in the process. The second source is the book “Ending 
Mozambique’s War” by Cameron Hume (1994). Hume was, as a delegate of the US, a 
participant/observer in the peace talks and wrote a detailed account of it very soon after the 
mediation process. In the case of Kosovo it was even more difficult to gather information about 
the negotiations. The exact events of the mediation process therefore remain unclear, but since 
there are enough secondary sources analyzing Sant’Egidio’s role in the process and the effect 
these negotiations had on the conflict provide enough information to draw conclusion from this 
case as well. The academic literature is also supplemented with journalistic sources. 
Operationalization 
To operationalize the independent variable, religious organizations, I have chosen one 
religious organization which will be analyzed on all factors mentioned in the theoretical 
framework. These are both contextual and procedural factors which have been proved to 
influence conflict mediation: the motivation, bias and leverage of the motivator, the nature of the 
conflict and the profile of the disputing parties. Another variable that is very important is the 
strategy used by the mediators and the course of the negotiations.  
The independent variable, religious organization, are expected to have a positive effect on 
the dependent variable, which is conflict mediation success. This variable will be operationalized 
along the spectrum described above. To test if the IV depends the DV, I will first look if peace 
talks have been started, then look of the violence stopped and lastly if a formal peace agreement 
has been signed. In the case of Kosovo this is slightly altered, because the negotiation did not 
involve peace talks but an end to the education problem. In that case I will research if direct 
talks have been established, if the short-term problems were solved and if an official agreement 
was reached. For both cases the long term effects will be studied as well to check if the 
agreement reached turned out to be stable and sustainable. 
 
14 
Expected outcomes 
The case, Sant’Egidio, is selected because of its positive influence they on various disputes. 
Nevertheless, I still expect to establish some general conclusions about the role of religious 
organizations in conflict mediation. Considering the literature written on this topic, religious 
actors have distinct characteristics which separates them from most other mediators. Religious 
organizations have spiritual and humanitarian motivations aimed to help the stricken 
population. They lack power and leverage in a political or economic sense but make up for this 
by being respected and trusted, especially in more traditional societies. Regarding resources, 
religious organizations often have many volunteers and a large (international) base from which 
money is collected to provide for the mediation costs. Furthermore, they often have political 
neutral venues to offer for the negotiations to be held. Since trust is the biggest asset of this type 
of mediators, it is important to remain unbiased during the negotiations. Therefore is might be 
expected that faith-based mediators are neutral mediators, which might influence the process 
positively. Religious mediators often lack the resources to coerce the parties into forming an 
official agreement. This means that they would more likely employ facilitative and formulative 
strategies, which have a proven positive effect on the sustainability of the agreement. Apart from 
the other important factors that affect mediation success, the nature of the conflict and profile of 
the disputants, religious organizations are expected to have a positive effect on mediation 
success. The expected positive effects can vary for different cases, ranging from a success in 
starting official, direct (peace) talks to outright conflict resolution.  
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Sant’Egidio 
 
The Community of Sant’Egidio will be the religious organization used to answer the 
research question. First, it needs to be determined how well this case is suited to this research, 
for this reason it must be compared to other religious organizations. This part chapter will 
determine to what extent Sant‘Egidio can be called a religious institution by putting it in a 
broader perspective. Furthermore questions about its bias, motivation, resources and general 
background will be answered in this segment to prepare the case for comparison within the two 
cases of conflict mediation. 
Religious peacemaking  
The peacemaking efforts of Sant’Egidio fit in a broader context of religious organizations 
doing work to create peace. The are a few examples of religious organizations playing a role in 
conflict mediation. I will shortly describe a few examples so the position of Sant‘Egidio can be 
compared to these other religious organizations. One example of mediation by a religious 
organization  is the work of the Inter Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL). This 
organization played an active role in the peacemaking process and were instrumental in the 
negotiation and signing of the Lome Peace Agreement. Also, The Quakers have been involved in 
international conflict mediation, for example in the Nigerian civil war in 1967 (Bercovich and 
Kadayifci-Orellana 2009, 180). The work for peace as done by Sant‘Egidio also fits in a more 
broad Catholic background. From the 20th century onwards, multiple popes have made 
statements that condemn war and promote peace. For example Pope Pius speaking against the 
Nazi’s during the second World War, but also today’s papal Twitter account spreading messages 
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of love and peace1. The Pope and the Vatican have also played a more active role in conflict 
mediation. An example is the Beagle Channel dispute between Chile and Argentina in 1985 
where the Pope successfully mediated. (Christiansen 2006 21-22).    
Sant’Egidio 
Sant ‘Egidio was founded in 1967 in Rome by Andrea Riccardi. This high-school student 
was only nineteen years old when  he gathered a group of fellow students to “listen to and to put 
the Gospel into practice” (Sant’Egidio). This group was inspired by the first Christian 
communities of the Acts of the Apostles and Francis of Assisi. At that time Rome was full of 
immigrants and poor people, and the newly founded community immediately began visiting 
them in the outskirts of Rome. People who got in contact with Sant‘Egidio started setting up 
communities in their own countries. In this way the community expanded in Europe, and from 
the 1980’s onward in Africa, the Americas, Indonesia and elsewhere. Sant’Egidio became 
involved in conflict through their international members, volunteers or contacts. Mozambique’s 
civil war was the first time Sant’Egidio played an active role in the peace process, and soon 
afterwards other conflicts were brought to their attention (Sant’Egidio; Bartoli 2001; Hume 
1994, 15-18). From the 1990’s onward Sant’Egidio gained much international fame for its 
contribution to peace building around the globe. It gained some nicknames like ‘UN of 
Trastevere’ and ‘diplomats of Sant’Egidio’ (For example: Bartoli 1999; Faggioli 2012, 22).  Also, 
the community earned some prestigious awards for their peacemaking work (Sant’Egidio).  
Sant’Egidio has become a name of peace and dialogue throughout the world, but in Africa in 
particular. Today the Community of Sant’Egidio is a worldwide movement of lay people and has 
more than 60.000 members in more than 73 countries and four continents throughout the world. 
Added to that are the numerous friends and volunteers who are not officially members of the 
community but are connected to their worldwide outreach (Entire segment: Sant’Egidio, 
O’Grady 2010 , Bartoli 2001, Hume 1994, 15-18).  
                                                          
1
 https://twitter.com/Pontifex 
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Religiousness  
The Community of Sant’Egidio describes itself as a ‘Church Public Lay Association’ 
(Sant’Egidio).  It has links with the Vatican, but is not part of this institution and its hierarchy. 
Sant’Egidio is a religious organization whose different communities around the world share the 
same principles and spirituality. Sant’Egidio is a Catholic community focusing on the principles 
of prayer, communicating the Gospel, Solidarity with the poor, Ecumenism and Dialogue (Bartoli 
2001). Its headquarters are based in the area of Trastevere in Rome and has maintained a 
continuous presence of prayer and welcome for the poor and for pilgrims. Sant’Egidio combines 
its peace work with religious activities, separate wings within the organization do not exist 
(Hume 1994, 16). Andrea Riccardi, the president of Sant’Egidio, said in an interview in 2004 that 
when asked if Sant’Egidio is an active or a spiritual community he refuses to define the 
community: “We're an active community, and we don't place limits on our activity. But the fulcrum 
of our activity is our spirituality, our prayer and our liturgy. […] Promoting peace and helping the 
poor are related aspects of trying to respond to today’s needs by drawing inspiration from the 
gospel,”  (O’Grady 2010). According to the website of Sant’Egidio the community basically 
extends its work from humanitarian aid to peacemaking efforts. The religiousness of Sant’Egidio 
becomes clear when reading these statements; their peace work is spriually inspired. Moreover, 
they believe in the power of joint prayer sessions to end conflict (Sant’Egidio). Scientific work 
backs up the statement that Sant‘Egidio classifies as a religious organization. Bartoli (2001) for 
example stated that the community’s main goals are related to its religious identity and take the 
character of prayer, service to the poor, and friendship which distinguishes them from every 
other actor in conflict resolution. He believes that Sant‘Egidio operates from three important 
catholic principles: Communio, for example shown in the joint prayer meetings; traditio in the 
sense that they base their works on the Gospel and original Scriptures; and pietas which means 
love for the poor. He concludes that Sant ‘Egidio is an example of catholic peacemaking and the 
fruit of Christian tradition. Christiansen (2006) supports this and mentions Sant’Egidio as an 
example of modern Catholic peacemaking. 
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Motivation/Bias 
The historical background of Sant‘Egidio explains its involvement in international conflict 
mediation. According to interviews and statements on its own website, Sant’Egidio’s main 
concern in worldwide poverty. The community was based upon the principle of helping the poor 
and their main focus nowadays is still based on this religious principle. According to the 
community, helping in resolving conflicts is a new way to assist the poor. It states multiple times 
on its website that ‘war is the mother of poverty’ (Sant’Egidio). This statement explains the 
transition they made from an organization which was mainly engaged in humanitarian activities, 
to an organization involved in conflict mediation around the globe. As Riccardi said in an 
interview: ”War creates suffering, destruction, and poverty. We try to help those who are the 
victims of conflicts be heard and persuade people that armed conflicts are not inevitable.” (O’Gary 
2010). Sant’Egidio believes that in the current globalizing world everybody can provoke wars, 
but that also means that everybody van work for peace (Sant’Egidio).  
General mediation method 
Sant’Egidio has been involved in multiple conflicts, thus some remarks can be made about 
their approach, method and strategy. Later in this thesis, the particular strategy to both cases 
will be described in more detail, but some introductory remarks can be made. What is 
remarkable is that most of their peace work is done in non-religious conflicts (Haynes 2009, 63). 
The main focus of the community of Sant’Egidio is creating a dialogue between the disputing 
parties. A reconversion of the war culture and creating a long term vision for peace in the 
affected society is a fundamental aspect of their work. The idea of a common future needs to be 
created and disputant parties need to accept each other as being one community.  Sant’Egidio 
uses a synergy of efforts by letting institutional and non-institutional, official governmental 
actors and civil society cooperate. The presence of powerful institutions in the mediation 
process is important because of their  ability to guaranty a correct implementation of the 
brokered agreement. Ex-UN Secretary General Burtos-Ghali backs this up by speaking of a 
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"mixture, unique in its kind, of governmental and non-governmental peacemaking activities" 
(Sant’Egidio).  
Conclusion 
Although more cases of religious organizations are needed to thoroughly answer the 
research question, Sant‘Egidio is at this moment the organization which forms the best single 
case for this research. Sant’Egidio obviously fits the category of a religious organization. Its high 
level of religiousness makes Sant‘Egidio the best focus for finding out the general role of 
religious organizations on conflict mediation. Sant’Egidio is an international organization which 
has existed since 1967 and gradually increased its activities, which makes it sufficiently 
experienced for analysis. Sant’Egidio is a Catholic community of lay people that highly values 
ecumenism. It is institutionalized, mainly in the sense of the powerful contacts they have and 
their place in international politics, but lacks the high degree of hierarchy that for example the 
Vatican has. To be short, the Community of Sant’Egidio is a religious organization that over the 
past decades has been involved in multiple conflicts which makes it a case well suited for this 
research.  
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Mozambique 
 
This chapter will analyze the conflict in Mozambique where Sant’Egidio played a major 
role in the mediation process. Firstly, the conflict itself will be described and analyzed. As 
discussed in the theoretical framework the ‘nature’ of the conflict is an influential factor on the 
mediation process. This is a broad concept, but it for example contains the timing of the 
mediation. The following questions will be addressed and in this way the nature of the conflict 
becomes somewhat clearer: To what extent was the conflict ‘ripe’ for a solution? How many 
parties were involved? What was the public opinion at that time? Did the civil society have an 
influence? After the analysis of the conflict, the mediation process will be described and 
analyzed. Questions about the profile of the disputant parties will be discussed, which has found 
to be of major influence on the outcome. Finally, the role of Sant’Egidio will be described and 
analyzed according to the factors that have proved to influence the mediation process. Of special 
importance is the strategy used by Sant’Egidio in this particular conflict. At the end of the 
chapter the nature of the conflict, the profile of the disputing parties, the role of the mediators 
and the course and strategy of the  mediation process of the Mozambican conflict should be 
comprehensively explained in order to help answering the research question later on in the 
thesis. 
The conflict 
Foreign involvement in Mozambique dates from 1494 when Pope Alexander VI gave 
Portugal the right to exploit the land. in 1498 the Portuguese  arrived at Mozambique, where 
over the next four centuries most  settlers and traders would concentrate along the coast. After 
1932 Portugal increased its share of Mozambique's trade to more than half the colony's total and 
the European population rose from 30.000 in 1930 to more than 200.000 in 1975. The 
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Europeans lived mostly in towns along the coast, from where they cooperated with the 
traditional tribal leaders who lived in the hinterlands. Education was almost non-existent in 
those remote areas, so the opportunities for the indigenous people were very low. After the 
collapse of fascism in Portugal in 1974, the new regime decided to grant Mozambique 
independence as fast as possible. The European population fled the country quickly and left it 
behind without an instructed and educated workforce (Bartoli 1999, 245-246). 
The Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) was founded in 1962. From 1964 
onwards FRELIMO fought for independence from Portugal. There were two factions within this 
movement. The dominant faction had more radical ideas as they believed that Mozambique 
should not only be freed of the Portuguese occupation, but also freed from traditional authority. 
Consequently, they wanted to restructure society according to the principles of scientific 
socialism. The other faction aimed at a takeover of the Portuguese government and educate new 
Mozambican leaders. In 1969 Samora Machel, a member of the radical faction, became the leader 
of FRELIMO. The guerillas tactics employed by FRELIMO had more impact than the more 
sophisticated weapons of the Portuguese army. After the overthrow of the Portuguese regime in 
Lisbon, the new authorities proposed a transition period which included elections before 
granting Mozambique full independence. FRELIMO did not cooperate however and on June 25 
1975, Machel was sworn in as Mozambique's first president (Bartoli 1999, Hume 1994, 9).  
The independent Mozambican government lead by Machel adhered to the socialist 
ideology, which mainly meant the nationalization of Mozambique’s agriculture and companies. 
Also in foreign policy Machel aligned himself with the communist states. The war in neighboring 
Rhodesia formed a problem in the first years of independence. Mozambique backed Mugabe's 
ZANU forces who struggled for independence, which caused the Rhodesian government to 
retaliate. Not only did they attack civilian targets in Mozambique, Rhodesia also founded and 
started backing a resistance movement in 1977. This movement later became known as 
Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) (Tavayanago 2010, 43: Hume 1994, 13-14). After 
the Rhodesian war ended in 1980 FRELIMO could focus on domestic policy. Because of the 
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world recession and severe drought during those years, Mozambique went through a hard time. 
The state control of the economy did not help this situation, which alienated parts of the 
population. This caused RENAMO to attract more recruits and to start fighting the government 
more active using guerilla tactics. RENAMO was largely funded by the South African government, 
but the financial transfers were formally stopped after an agreement between the states in 1984. 
From 1985 onwards FRELIMO became more pragmatic in its socialist principles and policies. In 
1986 Machel died in an accident, leaving behind a country suffering from its governments' 
policies, civil war and enduring poverty. Within two weeks a new leader was elected; the flexible 
and pragmatic former foreign minister Joaquim Chissano (Hume 1994, 4-12). In 1979 Afonso 
Dhlakama became the new leader of RENAMO. The former support of South Africa got this state 
involved in Mozamique’s civil war. This eventually lead to the first attempt at mediation in 
Pretoria in 1984. South Africa hosted discussions between RENAMO and the Mozambican 
government aimed at producing a cease-fire. RENAMO cut the talks off however which proved 
that it was still a shady institutionalized organization. Dhlakama lead both the civilian and 
military wing for example. Furthermore, RENAMO's human rights practices were horrific to such 
an extent that it became known as the ' Khmer Rouge' of Africa (Hume 1994, 14; (Tavayanago 
2010, 45).  
The civil war in Mozambique cost many lives and hindered the Mozambican economy 
severely. The only way to end the conflict was the cooperation of both FRELIMO and RENAMO in 
a process of dialogue and reconciliation. According to both Hume and Bartoli, the conflict 
seemed ripe for change in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At this point it became clear that 
neither side could reach a military victory. Also, the government’s policies were becoming more 
pragmatic and the international environment changed in a favorable way. The need to end the 
conflict was also high given the fact that there were more than two million refugees (Hume 1994, 
26; Bartoli 1999; Tavayanago 2010, 46). This did not mean that peace talks would be started 
easily, since there were man complications. FRELIMO was not willing to give its one-party rule 
up and refused to accept RENAMO as a serious political organization. It also did not want to 
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abandon its Marxist-Leninist ideology. RENAMO on the other hand had yet to articulate a 
political program. Both parties needed to develop peace options and only when that was done a 
formula for dialogue had to be created. Both parties started changing their goals from war to 
peace, but still a lot needed to be done to even begin the peacemaking process (Hume 1994, 26). 
Mediation process 
The commencement of the peace process was most difficult. Since there were to 
disputants that could not win the war, the only solution was to create dialogue. In Mozambique a 
third party was needed in order to arrange for the parties to come to the table, as well as 
providing a venue and covering the costs of these peace talks. Moreover, a constructive 
ambiance had to be created (Hume 1994, 26).  
By the end of 1988 both parties were rethinking their options and started considering 
moving away from civil war.  Also during this time, a lot of outsiders got involved. From 1988 
RENAMO developed contacts with the Kenyan government which led to a first attempt to create 
dialogue between the two disputants. Also, the South African government suggested during a 
meeting with Chissano in 1989 that they should ask the US to broker an agreement to end the 
civil war. Mozambican church leaders did the second attempt to explore the option of peace 
talks, urging president Chissano to meet with RENAMO. A few months later the religious leaders 
of Mozambique sent a telex to the Pope and to the Sant’Egidio asking them for help with the 
establishment of a cease-fire. This brought Dhlakama to Rome for an unofficial visit. Chissano in 
the meanwhile indicated wanting direct talks between the parties with church leaders assisting 
as a third party. (Hume 1994, 26-29).  
Both parties wanted to start a dialogue, but there were disagreements regarding the 
location of the peace talks and the role of a third party. The different positions as one side being 
the recognized government and the other side being an unrecognized opposition movement, 
caused a difference in preferences for peace talk settings. Chissano wanted a minor role of a 
third party, played by Mozambican church leaders, and overall wanted to keep the talks a 
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domestic affair. RENAMO however wanted the involvement of a internationally powerful and 
intrusive third party and wanted the talks to take place in Europe. In 1990 a minister of the 
Mozambican government proposed that Sant’Egidio could mediate the conflict after his visit to 
Rome. This organization formed the middle ground between a powerful international mediator 
and local religious facilitators so both parties agreed to let Sant’Egidio explore the possibility of 
peace talks without naming them as an official mediator. The meetings were to be held at the 
headquarters of Sant’Egidio in Rome, which was agreed to quickly by both parties. Moreover 
financial and diplomatic support were granted by the Italian government. They also send help in 
the form of Mario Raffaelli, a Socialist member of parliament who had been under-secretary at 
the Foreign Ministry with special focus on Africa for six years (Hume 1994, 29-31).  
From 8-10 July 1990 the first meeting between FRELIMO and RENAMO took place in Rome. 
The team of ‘observers’ consisted of Mario Raffalli, the archbishop of Beira Don Jaime Goncalves, 
and Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi representing the community of Sant’Egidio. The location 
for the talks was quickly settled, but two issues remained. The first one is the question of who 
should mediate the peace talks and what role they should take, which eventually got temporarily 
settled by letting the four observers continue their presence until a mediator was decided upon. 
The second issue regarded the agenda of the talks. The government wanted the peace process to 
begin with a cease-fire, after which RENAMO would be integrated in national politics. RENAMO 
on the other hand wanted to agree on a new political system and constitution before accepting a 
cease-fire (Hume 1994, 33). 
The second round of meetings were held between the eleventh and fourteenth of august, 
the mediator and agenda for the peace talks were to be discussed in this round. RENAMO was 
introduced to US representatives for the first time, causing them to want to include the US in the 
peace talks because of their expertise. Regarding the agenda, RENAMO’s wanted to settle the 
issue of the mediator first, then work out the political issues and only then discuss a cease-fire. 
The second round reached none of its goals, but some flexibility had been shown. Neither of the 
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delegations had the authority from its headquarters to change their initial propositions, which 
made flexibility difficult (Hume 1994, 36-37).  
After this second round both sides were being convinced by the observers that they 
themselves were best suited to mediate the peace talks. All observers and representatives from 
the US as well traveled back and forth to Mozambique to settle the issue of who should mediate 
(Hume 1994, 40). Round three was held in November 1990. The agenda proposed by the 
mediators was accepted the second day. First the presence and role of the Zimbabwean military 
during the period prior to the proclamation of the cease-fire would be discussed. After that the 
creation of the political and military conditions for peace in the country would be talked about 
(Hume 1999, 43). RENAMO wanted the Zimbabwean army to be removed from Mozambique but 
it was proposed to move them  to specific corridors -prior to complete withdrawal- where they 
could not be attacked by RENAMO. The mediators believed that if agreement could be reached 
on this issue, it would build confidence between the two parties and greatly enhance the chances 
of reaching peace. During the following weeks the mediators went back and forth between the 
parties, assisted by the representatives of the US. On 1 December an agreement was signed and 
with this a partial cease-fire reached (Hume 1994, 45-47). 
After the first two months a lot of progress had been made. A dialogue had been started 
and a good location had been found. Also the promotion of the four observers to mediators after 
the first two rounds was an important step. Moreover, the establishment of the military 
corridors made commercial movement possible which had positive effects on Mozambique’s 
economy and relations with its neighbors. There were also shortcomings, which most  
importantly entailed a lack of urgency shown by both parties.  After two months of talking, 
nothing had been done yet to alleviate the sufferings of the Mozambican people (Hume 1994, 
49).  
In January 1991 the fourth round of negotiations began. RENAMO did not want to continue 
the peace talks if the agreement on the corridors in which the Zimbabwean army would be 
concentrated would not be implemented correctly. Furthermore, RENAMO was advised to start 
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formulating their political wishes. Since no progress could be made, the mediators issued a press 
release stating that talks would be paused in order for both sides to  have time to reflect (Hume 
1994, 55-56). In May the fifth round began, after months of every representative travelling back 
and forth from Rome to Mozambique. Between the fourth and fifth round a lot has changed. 
FRELIMO had officially abandoned the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism and the Mozambican 
parliament had adopted laws that provided for multi-party elections. RENAMO also showed 
progress and developed documents expressing its political wishes (Hume 1994, 58-59). In round 
five RENAMO was fully committed again and presented its political requirements to make peace. 
The agenda could not be agreed upon however and the inflexibility of the parties returned. After 
three weeks in which the mediators traveled to Mozambique to speak to Dhlakama in person, 
the agenda was agreed upon. The following items were included: the law on political parties, the 
electoral system, military issues, a cease-fire and guarantees (Hume 1994, 63). Round six took 
place in the first week of August 1991 and concentrated on the political party law, but failed to 
reach an agreement on this topic. Round seven, held in October, did manage to reach a 
procedural agreement to facilitate further mediation. This seems an insignificant step since it did 
not settle any of the political issues, but it brought mutual recognition and understanding and 
cleared the way for substantial discussions (Hume 1994, 69-71). Round eight centered on 
Political party law and managed to reach an agreement. The talks transformed from centering on 
philosophical arguments to more substantive discussions. An agreement on the Election Law 
was reached after the ninth round of negotiations on March 12, and a joint communiqué was 
released. Also more national government got involved in the process (Hume 1994, 80-92).   
From this point on the character of the negotiations changed, issues to be discussed from 
then on would be more substantive and its effects would become visible immediately. Aside 
from that, the worsened humanitarian crisis in Mozambique worsened, creating a sense of 
urgency. Furthermore, since from round ten onwards military issues would be discussed, more 
international assistance and expertise was needed. State governments and the UN started 
providing both technical advice on these military issues and a legal framework to implement the 
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agreement (Hume 1994, 96). Round ten and the lobbying process afterwards led to agreement 
on some military issues. The most important part of the agreement was the role the UN would 
play in the implementation of the peace agreement. An African Summit in Rome in August 1992 
confirmed this agreement and was important because it included regional actors in the process, 
direct talks between Chissano and Dhlakama took place and the negotiation framework had 
gained new diplomatic credibility (Hume 1994, 112-115).  In the six weeks following the summit, 
representatives of each involved actor met separately and together to further discuss the peace 
agreement and its implementation. After it had been finalized using intensive negotiations in the 
final days, the official Peace Agreement was signed in Rome by Chissano and Dhlakama on 4 
October 1992 (Hume 1994, 137). The agreement is included in the thesis as Appendix A.  
Nature of the conflict and disputants 
Important in this research is the religious dimension of a conflict. This factor is likely 
influencing how appreciated a religious mediator is in the peace process and also its chance of 
succeeding. Mozambique has a high level of both ethnic and religious fragmentation (Haynes 
2009, 58) with a significant number of both Christian and Islamic groups. This division did not 
play a role in the Mozambican conflict however. What did play a role was Catholicism. Catholic 
leaders had supported the old –Catholic- regime during the independence war, which led 
FRELIMO to adopt a negative attitude towards this religion. Moreover FRELIMO adopted a 
scientific socialist ideology, which is known for being opposed to any religion. Once FRELIMO 
became the official state government it adopted negative policies towards churches. This is one 
of the reasons Don Jaime Goncalves turned to Sant’Egidio for help. Some catholic priests were 
being prosecuted and/or harassed by the government. RENAMO on the other hand never 
adopted a negative attitude towards religion. When the government eased its policies and 
became more pragmatic, this also applied to their stance towards religion.  This allowed church 
leaders to start a peace process and dialogue between the two disputants and ultimately the 
catholic community of Sant’Egidio to be a mediator (Bartoli 1999, Hume 1994, 13-15).  
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As mentioned before, the characteristics of the disputant parties were very important 
during the peace process. FRELIMO as the authority in Mozambique wanted to keep the civil war 
a domestic affair with as little outside involvement as possible. The party used to have a strong 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, but let this go in the early 1990s. Furthermore, they made 
autonomous efforts to establish a multi-party democracy during that time. These two changes 
within FRELIMO showed their desire to end the war and create durable peace. RENAMO formed 
violent opposition to the government since the late 1980s and became infamous because of the 
atrocities committed to civilians. RENAMO wanted a powerful international mediator to take an 
active role as a third party in the peacemaking process. Furthermore, RENAMO was not very 
well institutionalized which hindered diplomatic talks. With the help of the expertise of the 
mediation team, or representatives from the UN and US, RENAMO was able to formulate its 
requirements for peace in a non-aggressive, diplomatic way.  Both parties showed throughout 
the entire process a will to create a dialogue and ultimately a formal peace agreement. Flexibility 
did form a problem during the talks however, mainly caused by a lack of authority to act on 
behalf of their party. 
Analysis role Sant’Egidio 
The beginning of the worldwide peacemaking efforts of the community of Sant‘Egidio 
started in Mozambique. This involvement started through one person: Jaime Gonçalves. This 
man who was in Rome for his studies, became involved with Sant‘Egidio without becoming an 
official member. Years before their eventual role as mediators in the Mozambican conflict, 
Sant’Egidio had been involved in several development projects. Members of the community saw 
through these projects that development was impossible without peace, and peace was 
impossible unless the combatants could be brought together to talk to each other (Riccardi 
2004).  More importantly however, because humanitarian aid was being delivered by a religious 
organization with the help of local religious leader the state adopted a more positive view of 
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religion. The Catholic Church used to be seen as the ‘enemy of the people’ but the humanitarian 
efforts executed by Sant’Egidio changed this negative view (Sant’Egidio). 
The role of the community in Sant’Egidio has evidently been very important in 
Mozambique’s mediation process. Two of the four mediators were representatives of the 
organization in a peace process that lasted around two years. Their involvement in Mozambique 
before, during, and after the conflict is remarkable as well. The factors that have been proven to 
influence the outcome of the mediation process will be applied to this case. 
Motivation 
It is difficult to say something about the motivation of Sant’Egidio, because no other 
sources than the Community itself mention it. Sant’Egidio became involved in the conflict 
through Jaime Gonzalves, one of the friends of the community. The motivation for its 
involvement in the peace process is spiritual and humanitarian. As can be read in the profile on 
Sant’Egidio in the previous chapter, the community wants to reach out to the poor. As they 
believe that war is the mother of poverty, peacemaking efforts form an important mean to reach 
the goal of helping the poor (Sant’Egidio). There is no other agenda or other interests than this –
in their eyes sacred- objective.  
Leverage 
In this particular case, Sant‘Egidio itself did not have a particular leverage. Religion was 
not a dimension in this conflict, and the parties had no religious identity, so Sant’Egidio did not 
have spiritual leverage. Moreover political leverage or financial leverage were non-existent 
because of the size of this religious organization. It could be argued however that the lack of 
power and money had a contributing effect to the peace process. The parties were divided on 
the issue whom to choose as a mediator. With one side wanting a powerful international 
mediator and the other wanted local religious leaders as a mediator –if any at all- the 
combination of a religious organization, a local religious leader and a foreign politician turned 
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out a perfect middle ground. Also influencing the process however was the role of major 
international players as well as governments of regional states. The UN oversaw the 
implementation of the peace agreement, the USA gave constant advise throughout the process, 
the Italian government was responsible for the financial aid and logistics and other regional 
governments were responsible upholding the earlier corridor deal. It could be argued that even 
though those players were not the mediators they have influenced the process and its outcome 
(Bartoli 1999, 257-260; Hume 1994: Branco 2011, 78).  
Bias 
One important factor influencing the success of a mediator is the amount of bias or 
neutrality of the mediator. Again, it is difficult to analyze the amount of bias since no sources 
make a mention of this. The community of Sant’Egidio was a complete outsider in this conflict, 
which does not automatically guarantee its neutrality, decreases he chance of deeply rooted 
prejudice against one of the parties.  The motivation of Sant’Egidio can also be an  indication on 
its neutrality. Sant’Egidio was not directly involved in the conflict and had no personal interest 
to gain from peace or other agenda. Also, multiple sources mention the neutrality of Sant’Egidio 
as one of the most important factors explaining the success of the conflict mediation (Hayden 
2009, 70: Little and Applebee 2004,12: Bartoli 1999). 
Resources  
Sant’Egidio was able to contribute a number resources to the peace process. The first one 
is people and time. This is believed to be a resource that specifically non-state actors have to 
offer and that help the peace process (Little & Applebee 2004, 11; Bartoli 1999). Furthermore 
the community had a neutral venue to host the peacetalks. This was important because finding a 
location was an important issue at the start of this peace process. RENAMO wanted to meet 
outside of Africa, preferably in Lisbon. The Mozambican government however was more keen to 
hold the talks in Mozambique or in the region. In providing this more unofficial location 
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Sant’Egidio formed a middle ground. The location also lead to the Italian government covering 
all the costs made during the peace process.  
Strategy 
As shown before, there is no consensus within the scientific field of conflict mediation 
which strategy is most effective. Strategies range from a very passive role to a more active or 
even manipulative role. I am distinguishing three types of strategies: facilitation, formulation 
and manipulation. In this case a combination of facilitative and formulative strategies have been 
used by Sant’Egidio. The most important task for the mediation team was to start and facilitate 
the dialogue between the two parties. Sant’Egidio did this with the help of suitable partners, 
bringing messages across and providing a location for the peace talks. The mediators also went 
back and forward a lot between the two delegations, both when they were in Rome as well as 
traveling to Mozambique, to facilitate communication. Also, a lot of work was put into agenda 
setting and the formulation of partial accords and the final Peace Agreement.  
Outcome 
To say something about the role of Sant’Egidio in this particular conflict mediation process, 
it is important to determine the effect it has had. Earlier in this thesis three possible positive 
outcomes of conflict mediation have been defined. If all three are achieved then the best possible 
outcome has been reached. The lowest form of success is a start of dialogue between the 
disputant parties. In this case this goal has obviously been achieved. Not only did the community 
of Sant’Egidio start a dialogue between the government and RENAMO, it also kept it going. The 
government’s view of RENAMO was transformed from that of an insurgent violent group to a 
serious political opponent. Sant’Egidio accomplished this through the offering of a location for 
the talks, but the representatives also traveled to Mozambique a few times to enable 
communication between the parties. The next positive outcome that can be achieved is an end of 
the violence. Already early on in the process a partial cease-fire was reached and later on the 
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process gradually stopped all violence. The highest form of a positive achievement in a conflict 
mediation process is a formal peace agreement. This goal was also met with the signing of a 
peace treaty on October fourth 1992. After two years of peace talks formal peace had been 
reached. More importantly, a durable democratic pluralistic democracy was created.  
Conclusion 
Sant’Egidio played a key role in the conflict mediation process of Mozambique. According 
to Bartoli the community provided both physical and psychological space (Bartoli, 257). With 
two of the four mediators being important members of the community of Sant’Egidio and one 
other being a close ‘friend’ of the organization, the impact that this particular organization had 
on this particular conflict mediation process is undeniable. The outcome is also clearly 
successful, meaning that all three possible positive outcomes were reached.  
Sant’Egidio is a neutral mediator with little leverage. The resources they had to offer were 
time, people and physical space. It can be concluded that the factor power was absent from 
Sant’Egidio’s side in this process of  conflict mediation. This type of mediator –the weak 
mediator- has not proven to be more effective in every conflict. In this conflict it is believed 
however to have had a positive influence (for example Bartoli; Hume; Haynes). Another 
important aspect of this mediator were its motivation for taking on this role. Without any 
agenda or self-interest the mediators linked to Sant’Egidio acted from a spiritual and 
compassionate basis. Both parties did not doubt this and believed their only goal was to create 
peace and serve the Mozambican interest. The factors mentioned above led to trust. This is 
believed to have created the synergetic environment and supported the will of both parties for 
peace (Bartoli 1999, Haynes 1994). 
Can the success of the conflict mediation be ascribed to Sant’Egidio? The answer cannot be 
a full yes. Firstly, the nature of the dispute and the profile of the disputant parties are of great 
influence. After fifteen years of civil war, both parties were at a point where they wanted peace. 
Furthermore, the ethnic and religious cleavages were not dividing the society in a problematic 
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way. This is shown in the fact that Mozambicans chose reconciliation over justice and the war 
criminals were not prosecuted after peace had been reached. It can therefore be argued that the 
conflict was ‘ripe’ for peace (Bartoli 1999, 250, 262). Also, the leaders were willing to end the 
war. In the late 1880’s both parties started looking for ways to start a dialogue after slowly 
realizing that this war could not be won by either of them (Hume 1994; Bartoli 1999, 251). The 
second argument which could undermine the role that the religious mediators played in the 
peace making process is the role the outsiders played. The USA had a delegation in Rome that 
was constantly available for expert advice. Also, the Italian government made this peace possibly 
in an important way by covering the expenses. The national governments that helped keeping up 
the partial cease-fire were also of crucial importance in the mediation process. Lastly, perhaps 
the peace would not have proven durable if the UN had not been there to implement the peace 
agreement.  
Concluding, the success of the Mozambican conflict mediation process can at least partially 
be ascribed to the three –out of four- religious mediators. It was a team effort with lots of actors 
contributing, but the community of Sant’Egidio was always in the center. Riccardi said in an 
interview: “Because we were known and trusted, we managed to bring them together” (O’Gary 
2010). The specific religious aspect of the mediator proved to make them trustworthy. Perhaps 
due to their lack of power, Sant’Egidio was being perceived as truly compassionate and acting 
for the Mozambican people. The peace process was not easy or short, even though both parties 
wanted peace. This proves that the factor of ‘ripeness’ for peace does not automatically mean 
that durable peace is reached. It takes much effort from multiple actors and a lot of other factors 
can influence the process. In this case all the issues were overcome and lasting peace was 
reached. As Riccardi said: 
“In Mozambique, there was something of a miracle after the war, because the peace was real 
and it was a peace of the people. People don't kill each other anymore, there was a true process of 
reconciliation.” (Allen 2004) 
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Kosovo 
The conflict in Kosovo will form the second case in this study. In this conflict Sant’Egidio 
did not mediate direct peace talks or negotiations to end the violence in the area, but the talks 
concentrated solely on the problem of education. In the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
the Serbian government in control of Kosovo forced the Albanian students to take Serbian 
curricula at school in the Serbian language. By 1992, the Albanians had established a shadow 
government and a parallel social and educational system. Even though this shadow government 
was able to provide rudimentary education, a lot of children still were not able to attend high 
school or university. Sant’Egidio got involved through their humanitarian work in Kosovo and 
established contacts with both Milošević and Rogova. The Community of Sant’Egidio mediated 
direct talks regarding the educatioaln issue and eventually helped to reach an agreement. 
Initially, the outcome of this agreement appeared to be positive, but the agreement was not 
implemented and contributed to further escalation of the conflict. In this chapter I will, first of all, 
look into the historical background of the conflict.  Secondly, I will proceed to explain the 
educational issue. Third, the mediation process and its outcome will be described. Finally, I will 
analyze the role that Sant’Egidio has played in the negotiation process according to the factors 
set out in chapter 2.  
Historical background 
In order to be able to fully understand the conflict of Kosovo properly, it is best to give a 
short overview of its history. Kosovo has always been a border region and throughout the past 
century has belonged to different empires, kingdoms or republics. Throughout the 13th and 14th 
centuries Kosovo became the political and spiritual center of the newly found Serbian Empire. 
After that the area became part of some small principalities (Daskalovski 2003, 14-15). The 
Ottoman Empire gained power over Kosovo from 1389 onwards –where the Battle of Kosovo 
took place- but only fully conquered it in 1455 (Malcolm 1998; Daskalovski 2003, 14).  
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Before the Ottoman rule over Kosovo, the Serbs formed an overwhelming majority in the 
area. Due to raids and slaving forays this number decreased heavily and also led to the Great 
Serb Migrations in the 17th and 18th centuries, causing the Albanian population to exceed the 
Serbian population in number (Daskalovski 2003, 15: Malcolm 1998). Anscombe (2006) 
suggests that the population of Kosovo was ethnically mixed in the Ottoman period and that 
both ethnicities dominated the other at different times.  
In the 19th century ethnic nationalism developed throughout the Balkans. The underlying 
ethnic tensions became part of a broader struggle of Christian Serbs against Muslim Albanians. 
Serbian nationalism became centered in Kosovo because of the mythical battle of Kosovo Polje 
took place there. It is said that on this battlefield King Lazar got the choice of a worldly or 
heavenly kingdom and he chose the latter. This decision made him a Christ-like martyr and 
Kosovo became a region that was not only important for Serbian nationality but also a holy 
religious site (Johnston 1993, 187). Even though few facts about this battle can be historically 
confirmed, this folk-poetic tradition transformed into a historical national self-consciousness 
with strong religious ties during the nineteenth century (Anscombe 2006, 761: Malcolm 1998, 
79).  
After the end of World War I in 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was 
established, which was transformed in 1929 to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Malcolm 1998, 264, 
283). Between 1912 and 1941, the Belgrade government initiated a large-scale Serbian re-
colonization in order to increase the number of Serbs as opposed to ethnic Albanians 
(Daskalovski 2003, 16). Moreover, Kosovar Albanians were not allowed to receive education in 
their language anymore. Because the Kingdom only recognized the Croat, Serb and Slovene 
nations and their languages became the official state languages. In this period Albanians were 
forced to emigrate both with a land reform and with other violent measures (Malcolm 1998). In 
1935 and 1938 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Turkey signed agreements on the expatriation of 
240.000 Albanians to Turkey, but this eventually did not take place because of World War II 
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(Daskalovski 2003, 16). After the axis invasion in 1941 Kosovo became part of a greater Albania, 
which was controlled by Italy and later Germany. This incorporation of Kosovo into Albania 
along with an anti-Serbian and Albanian nationalistic rhetoric used by the occupiers, caused an 
inflow of Albanians(Daskalovski 2003, 16: Malcolm 1998, 291, 304, 313). Ethnic tensions rose 
during the War and increased casualties in the area. Furthermore, tens of thousands of Serbs –
mainly colonists who moved there in the late 1930s- fled from Kosovo during the war (Malcolm 
1998 312, 313). Despite Kosovo being a part of greater Albania during the World War II, it was 
incorporated in a new socialist Yugoslavia. Kosovo became an autonomous ‘region’ within the 
Yugoslavian state (Daskalovski 2003, 17). Tensions arose in this period between the ethnic 
Albanians and Yugoslav government and repressive measures were imposed on Albanian 
Kosovars (Malcolm 1998, 314). The Islam was repressed in this period by encouraging 
Albanians and other Muslim Slavs to emigrate to Turkey. When the repressive leader Rankovic 
was ousted in 1966 the situation changed positively for the Albanian Kosovars. Substantial 
autonomy was created for Kosovo and a Muslim Yugoslav nationality was officially recognized 
(Malcolm 1998, 324). In 1974 Kosovo was granted constitutional autonomy and gained the 
status of a Socialist Autonomous Province (Daskalovski 2003, 17: Guzina 2003, 33: Malcolm 
1998, 327-329, 333). 
After Tito’s death in 1981, Albanian nationalism heightened which led to protests against 
the Serbian government (Malcolm 1998, 335, 337: Guzina 2003, 33). Various assaults and other 
hate crimes were reported by the Serbian population, including churches and monasteries 
(Kofos and Veremis 1998, 132: Malcolm 1998, 339). Aside from that, Kosovo was hit hard by the 
economic crisis of 1980. Both factors caused a lot Serbians to emigrate, causing a drop of Serbian 
population in Kosovo from 23.6% in 1961 to 13.2% in 1982 (Daskalovski 2003, 17: Malcolm 
1998, 331: Guzina 2003, 33: Kofor and Veremis 1998, 132). In 1981 the Albanian protests 
resulted in the Yugoslav government declaring a state of emergency and the arrival of territorial 
defense units in Kosovo. After these protests, the Yugoslave government revoked the rights that 
had been granted to Kosovo in 1974 (Malcolm 1998, 344). During this period the Serbian 
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Orthodox church began reviving the myth of King Lazar and issued calls for the protection of 
Kosovo (Johnston 1993, 188). The Serbian population accused the Albanian Kosovars of 
genocide and ethnic cleansing, even though police records do not provide evidence for this 
(Malcolm 1998, 339, 340).  
In 1989, Milošević drastically reduced Kosovo’s special autonomous status by revoking its 
authority to pass its own laws. Furthermore a policy of cultural oppression of the Albanian 
Kosovars was commenced (Kofos and Veremis 1998, 134). Martial law had been imposed on 
Kosovo and after the riots continued the Serbian army was sent there in the beginning of 1990 
(Daskalovski 2003, 17: Malcolm 1998, 343). The Albanian population of Kosovo responded with 
a non-violent resistance separatist movement. In 1991, an illegal referendum was held which 
eventually led to the declaration of the ‘Republic of Kosova’, with Ibrahim Rugova as its 
president (Malcolm 1998, 347-349: Guzina 2003, 36: Smith 2010, 181: Kofos and Veremis 1998, 
131). This republic was quickly recognized by Albania, but no support followed (Daskalovski 
2003, 18). The shadow government considered Serbia as a foreign state so refused to take part 
in its elections and encouraged widespread civil disobedience to the Serbian state. Moreover the 
shadow state created a parallel public system including education, medical care and taxation 
(Malcolm 1998, 347-349: Koinova 2009, 98). The Dayton Agreement which ended the war in 
Bosnia in 1995 brought no prospects for the situation in Kosovo. This was a disappointment for 
president Rugova, who had been encouraging his people to be patient and resort to non-violent 
measures so that the international community could impose a settlement on the Serbian 
government (Malcolm 1998, 353: Smith 2010, 183). On the contrary, the Dayton accords had the 
effect of strengthening and legitimizing the regime of Milošević (Smith 2010, 181). In 1996,  
Rugova started official negotiations with Milošević in 1996 which caused even more criticism 
from the Albanian population (Malcolm 1998, 354). These negotiations between Rugova and 
Milosevic will form the focus point for this case and will be analyzed below. 
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Concluding the centuries of events leading up to this particular conflict, a few points are 
important to repeat. First of all, the fact that Kosovo is a border area where a mix of ethnicities 
have been living in different compositions for centuries. The Christian Orthodox Serbians are 
one important group but the Muslim Albanians have formed a majority since the Ottoman 
Empire got control over Kosovo (Smith 2010, 181). Secondly, the fact that religion has always 
been linked to ethnic nationalism in the Kosovo conflict. For the Serbians Kosovo is a holy site 
where Serbian nationalism and historical grievance is concentrated. According to Johnston 
(1993, 187) Kosovo is the ‘Cradle of the Serb nation’  because this is the place where the epic 
Kosovo Polje battle took place (Malcom 1998, 61: Daskalovski 2003, 15: Anscombe 2006, 760). 
The centuries following this battle entailed mass conversion of Albanian settlers in the area to 
the Islam (Malcolm 1998, 109). For the Muslims religion is not particularly linked to Albanian 
nationalism, since they have a secular ideology (Johnston 2003, 188). During the Serbian rule 
there was another form of religious oppression since people were subjected to mass conversions. 
The Islam was repressed at the times of Serbian/Yugoslav rule and the Muslim population was 
repeatedly encouraged to emigrate. This makes the nature of the conflict highly religious and 
strongly linked to ethnic nationalism.  
The educational conflict 
The negotiations held in 1996 between the  Kosovar ‘President’ Rugova and Serbian 
President Milošević form a very curious event in the Kosovar conflict. Kofos and Veremis (1998, 
135) even call its eventual outcome -the Education Agreement- a ‘pleasant surprise’. It was the 
first official agreement reached between the Serb government and the Albanian community in 
the twentieth century (Morozzo della Rocca, 13). The issue of negotiation was the education 
system. On 7 august 1997 the Serbian Parliament abrogated all province-specific aspects of the 
educational system. It mandated uniform elementary and secondary school programs for all 
schools in Serbia, including those in Kosovo, irrespective of the cultural needs of the various 
national communities (Smith 2010, 181). Albanian teachers refused to implement the new social 
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sciences and humanities curricula which caused the Serbian authorities to cut off the funding for 
Albanian schools in Kosovo and fire 21.000 teachers (Judah 2008, 73). In addition to these 
measures, the enrolment of Albanian children in secondary education was restricted. In the 
beginning of the 1991/1992 school year the Serbian authorities banned Albanian students and 
teachers from school buildings unless they agreed to follow the Serbian curricula.  These 
restrictions were already implemented at Pristina University a year earlier (Guzina 2003, 38, 39: 
Kosovo Information Center 1996).  As a consequence, the shadow government of Rugova set up 
its own education system, even though the level of this education was only rudimentary and it 
increased the  income tax for the Albanian population of Kosovo (Judah 2008, 73). By creating a 
shadow education system the Albanians incorporated education into their territorial and 
political demands of Kosovar independence. The shadow schools combined a social and political 
function and as an effect this meant that almost all of the Albanian population became involved 
in the Kosovar independence conflict (Koinova 2009, 102: Sörensen 2006, 320)   
The Community of Sant’Egidio got involved in the Balkans in the early 1990s as the 
situation in the area worsened. The Community tried to increase its contacts there in order to 
promote peace and dialogue. Its goal was two-fold: creating an open dialogue between the 
various ethnic communities –Orthodox, Catholic and Islamic- and ultimately ending the conflict 
and durable peace in Kosovo (Morozzo della Rocca 1998, 13). On the website of Sant’Egidio they 
name Rugova as their friend which enabled them to establish contacts with the Albanian 
Kosovar shadow government. The Orthodox Church helped them establish contacts with the 
Serbian government (Sant’Egidio).  In 1993 the first formal mediation effort was made by 
Sant’Egidio as they offered various peace proposals to Milošević, Rugova and Albanian president 
Sali Berisha in separate private meetings. These possible solutions were not accepted however. 
The issues they discussed in the meetings mainly concerned the large cleavage between the 
Serbian and Albanian population in Kosovo. Discrimination against the Albanian population 
deepened the division between the population groups and the declaration of the independent 
Republic of Kosovo and the creation of a parallel system worsened the situation. From 1993 to 
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1997 there were two complete separate societies in Kosovo ignoring one another except for 
violent confrontations (Morozzo della Rocca 1998, 13). Especially the cultural life of the 
Albanians suffered from this as they basically lived without the support of a state.  
During 1994 and 1995 Sant’Egidio’s efforts showed no signs of improvement from both 
sides. The Serbs denied that there was an ethnic issue in Kosovo and claimed that the problem 
was that the Albanian population refused to be Serbian citizens. The Albanians on the other 
hand would not compromise on their claim of Kosovar independence. Despite this inflexibility 
by both parties, Sant’Egidio was able to sustain the dialogue with both sides. Representatives of 
the Community were regularly sent to Pristina and Belgrade for talks and Albanian leaders were 
invited to the Sant’Egidio headquarters in Rome. Furthermore Sant’Egidio provided 
humanitarian aid to both population groups (Morozzo della Rocca 1998, 14: Humanitarian Law 
Centre 1995). In June 1995 Sant’Egidio noticed a greater flexibility from both parties and a 
willingness to start a dialogue with each other. The Serbs had rejected several other offers of 
international mediation because they feared it would undermine the position of Serbia. 
Sant’Egidio accepted Sant’Egidio’s offer of facilitation because of its trustworthy reputation and 
good contacts. The Serbs decided that Sant’Egidio could facilitate a dialogue on a more informal 
and unofficial level. The Albanians accepted Sant’Egidio’s role as well, mostly because of their 
complete independence of the Serbian state. Moreover, the involvement of Sant’Egidio meant an 
internationalization of the Kosovo conflict which was important for the Albanians (Morozzo 
della Rocca, 14).   
After months of (pre)negotiations the direct dialogue started in the summer of 1996.  One 
of the preconditions the Serbian government had was that Kosovar independence would not be 
discussed in the talks. The mediators of Sant’Egidio therefore proposed to start the dialogue by 
focusing on concrete issues regarding education, health care, culture, media etcetera. Broader 
political and institutional issues could be dealt with later. This agreement of the Serbs to enter 
these negotiations formed the first event in which the Albanian population was recognized as a 
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distinct community (Morozzo della Rocca 1998, 14: Koinova 2009, 102). On September 1 1996 
the Educational Agreement for Kosovo was signed by Milošević and Rugova. The outcome of the 
negotiations was successful and it was agreed that 300,000 Albanian children and teachers 
could return to school and 12,000 to university after five years (Kofos and Veremis 1998, 135). 
Furthermore the agreement called for the establishment of an implementation commission of 
three representatives from the government and three from the Albanian community (Morozzo 
della Rocca 1998, 13: Sant’Egidio 1998: Kosovo Information center 1996). 
This agreement seemed a very promising step in the Kosovo conflict since it was perceived 
to make a contribution to general political accommodation (Morozzo della Rocca 1998, 13). 
Moreover the Agreement signified that the two leaders, even though unofficially, recognized 
each other’s authority (Kofos and Veremis 2008, 135). There many positive responses to the 
agreement, for example Kosova Prime Minister Dr. Bujar Bukoshi stated that he considered the 
agreement as a positive development and stated it was one of many steps that Serbia must 
undertake before internationally mediated negotiations could start. Also the European 
Commission, Germany and Great Britain spoke out in favor of the recent developments 
regarding the Education Agreement (Kosovo Imformation Center 1996). Also Sant’Egidio 
expressed itself positively regarding the agreement stating that it showed that dialogue is 
possible and a willingness to move beyond the impasse and reconciliation existed (Sant’Egidio). 
The Education agreement called for a commission that would implement the proposal 
which would include three Serbian and three Albanian members with a member of Sant’Egidio 
as its chairman. After the signing of the agreement the Serbs objected to Sant’Egidio taking this 
position, but due the lack of any other alternatives accepted it eventually. The Albanians also had 
objections to the agreement, mainly that the problems regarding the university had to be 
prioritized above the high school problems. Furthermore they still opposed the idea of 
integrating themselves into a Yugoslavian educational structure. Even though the agreement 
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was signed by all parties, discrimination against Albanian teachers and students continued 
(Kosovo News Center 1996).  
The agreement failed to be implemented because of several factors. The first one was its 
vagueness. Precarious subjects like the Serbian-language curriculum or exact deadlines and 
mechanisms for its implementation were left out of the agreement on purpose (Koinova 2009, 
102). This vagueness was not the only cause for the failure of the agreement, since it merely 
showed the lack of desire of both parties to address the core issue of the Kosovo conflict. 
Another cause for the failure of the agreement was the question of legitimacy of the 
international mediation performed by Sant’Egidio in what the Serbs considered a domestic issue. 
Also the general issues of increasing Serbian nationalism and increasing political and military 
tensions in the area played a big role in the failure of implementation (Morozzo della Rocca, 14). 
The two leaders are assumed to have used the agreement for their own political gains. Rugova 
wanted to show that Milošević recognized him as the Kosovar’s legitimate leader. Milošević on 
the other hand wanted to show the international community that he was willing to negotiate 
with the Albanians. The fact that the committee only met very few times without making any 
progress shows that both sides were not willing to follow up on the agreement and used it for 
political goals (Koinova 2009, 102). Implementation did not happen until the protocol of 
implementation was signed on March 23 1998, after which the Albanians began to re-enter the 
public schools and universities (Morozzo della Rocca 1998, 13, 14; Sörensen 2006, 348).  
Aftermath 
The negotiations and talks held between Rugova and Milošević took place in the heat of 
the war in Kosovo. The decision of Rugova to have official talks with Milošević caused a lot of 
criticism of his own population. Serbia failed to implement the agreement and Malcolm (1998, 
354) argues that Milošević might have used the talks to undermine Rugova’s credibility. The 
failure of the agreement fueled sentiments against Rugova’s nonviolent tactics and thus actually 
undermined Rugova’s credibility for its own population. Since there were no other prospects of a 
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solution for the education issue, Albanian students started big protests. Rugova disapproved of 
these protests saying that it would prevent the implantation of the agreement. The students took 
the matters in their own hands however and established contacts with the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA).  Other factors also contributed to the weakening of Rugova’s position such as the 
political crisis in Albania of 1997 and the start of shootings and bomb attacks against Serb 
institutions and officials. This more violent strategy was led by the KLA, a newly established 
ethnic Albanian para-military group. The KLA eventually prevailed over the non-violent 
resistance movement and by then the Kosovo war fully developed (Malcolm 1998, 355). The war 
would only be dissolved after the NATO bombed Yugoslavia in 1999. 
Analysis role of Sant’Egidio 
Sant’Egidio facilitated the convening of the parties, but also provided members for the 
commission to implement the agreement. The official Education Agreement explicitly mentions 
and thanks the Community of SAnt’Egidio (Morozzo della Rocca 1998, 13). The role of 
Sant’Egidio as mediator is thus clearly acknowledged by both parties. I will continue to discuss 
all the factors influencing the mediation process in order to answer the research question about 
the role of Sant’Egidio in conflict mediation.  
Motivation 
Morozzo Della Rocca (1998, 15) states that the effectiveness of Sant’Egidio is caused by its 
motivation. He states that the members of the Community have a strong sense of responsibility 
for people who are suffering, especially poor people. Sant’Egidio states on its website that their 
friendship with Rugova was an important motivation as well to become active in Kosovo. More 
importantly they saw a process towards cohabitation as a realizable goal and wanted to prevent 
the ‘disasters in other parts of ex-Yugoslavia. Even the failure of the Education Agreement did 
not cause Sant’Egidio to lose hope for Kosovo. They stated that the accord showed that dialogue 
was possible and that there existed a will to move beyond the impasse. Even after the conflict 
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escalated they continued their humanitarian and religious activities in Kosovo, which shows 
their dedication (Sant’Egidio). 
Leverage 
The leverage that the Community of Sant’Egidio has is virtually non-existent. They have no 
international power and only little influence on the big institutions. One could argue that the 
Community has a high degree of spiritual leverage since religion is an important aspect in this 
conflict. None of the involved parties is Catholic however and I do not believe that the Christian 
Serbs would regard Sant’Egidio as spiritual guidance since the Orthodox denomination is very 
distinct form the Catholic denomination of Sant’Egidio.  
Bias 
It is difficult to say anything about the degree of bias Sant’Egidio showed in the negotiation 
process. None of the parties – The Serbians, the Albanians and Sant’Egidio itself- mentioned 
anything about partiality. Also, none of the secondary sources writing about these negotiations 
mention anything about it. Sant’Egidio states Rugova as a friend of the Community which could 
signify a bias, but on the other hand they share more religiousness with the Serbians.  
Resources 
Sant’Egidio does had again mainly time and people to offer to the mediation process. 
Another resource that proved valuable are its international contacts. These include political 
contacts, and  members and volunteers of Sant’Egidio in the area. This makes Sant’Egidio 
understand the conflict better in order to help the people in multiple ways, both by giving 
humanitarian aid and working towards peace. Their international contacts include experienced 
diplomats, political figures and other professionals who can contribute knowledge and 
experiences helping the mediation process. One example is the explicit support Sant’Egidio and 
the negotiation process received from the Contact Group, an informal grouping of influential 
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countries (Williams and Waller 2002, 861).  Furthermore Sant’Egidio possesses a very 
functional location for negotiations at their headquarters in Rome (Morozzo della Rocca, 15). 
Strategy 
For these negotiations Sant’Egidio mainly used facilitative strategies. They established a 
line of communication between both parties (Sant’Egidio). By going back and forth between the 
representatives of all the parties the mediators prepared everyone involved for the negotiations. 
Furthermore they offered to chair the implementation commission, which shows a lasting 
commitment to help solve the conflict. It could be possible that Sant’Egidio also used formulative 
strategies by influencing the content of the agreement, but this is not mentioned by any source.  
Outcome 
In this case the mediation process was not intended to reach peace, so the three types of 
success set out before are not completely applicable. I will slightly redefine the three degrees of 
success. The first one; creating a dialogue stays the same in this case. The second goal in conflict 
mediation process is the end of violence. In this case this can be redefined as the possibility of 
Albanian students to return to school. The third goal was originally an official peace agreement. I 
would like to alter that to an official durable agreement. The first goal was definitely reached 
since dialogue was started.  The second level of success was also reached, since an  official 
agreement had been signed, making it the first official written agreement between the Serb 
government and the Albanian community in the 20th century. The agreement did not seem 
durable however, since it did not prevent the future conflict. Therefore the third goal was not 
reached in this case. It must be stated that although two of the mediation goals were reached the 
Education Agreement had an overall negative effect in Kosovo. Both leaders are now assumed to 
have used these negotiations for their own political gain. The negotiations weakened Rugova’s 
position which contributed to the rise of the violent KLA. This led –although not directly- to the 
escalation of the conflict and a major increase in violence. 
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Conclusion 
It is difficult to fully analyze the role that the Community of Sant’Egidio played in the 
Kosovo conflict. From the beginning of the 1990s the members became involved in the area, 
mainly by providing humanitarian aid. By developing contacts in the region and a strong 
motivation to help the population even more by ending the conflict they started their attempt to 
do the latter. The largest challenge was starting a dialogue between both parties. The Serbian 
government was reluctant to start negotiations with the parallel government of Kosovo, because 
that would recognize their authority. The Albanians on the other hand were reluctant to start 
negotiations because that could be interpreted as an acceptance of the Serbian regime.  The 
Albanians therefore insisted on a strong international mediator whereas the Serbians regarded 
this issue as a domestic affair and refused these kind of mediators. Even though the Community 
of Sant’Egidio was an international mediator, they remained non-governmental which proved to 
be an outstanding compromise. Using mainly facilitative strategies they managed to create a 
direct dialogue between the Albanian leader Rugova and the Serbian President Milošević. This 
was a unique accomplishment considering it  was the first time both parties had direct talks 
together in the 20th century. Sant’Egidio managed this with their trustworthy status and strong 
motivation for peace. Another accomplishment was the signing of an official agreement after a 
year of (indirect) negotiations. Kofos and Veremis (1998, 136) name this case as a specific 
“example of how small actors can succeed in mediation where great powers fail”. The agreement 
was not correctly implemented however and both discrimination of Albanian students and 
teachers and ethnic violence continued.  
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Comparative Analysis and conclusion 
Now that the role of Sant’Egidio in both cases have been analyzed it is important to 
compare the cases in order to contract general conclusions about the role of religious 
organizations in conflict mediation.  As set out in the beginning of this thesis, the role of 
organizations can be analyzed with the help of seven factors. Scientific research has shown that 
certain characteristics of the mediator and its strategy are of great influence on the mediation 
process, but it is not determined if those factors increase or decrease the chance of success. It 
seems that a certain type of mediator using a certain type of strategy has a different chance of 
success in different  conflicts, making the mediator very context-dependent . Therefore  the 
nature of the conflict and the characteristics of the disputant parties are of great importance to 
the chance of success of mediation and need to be analyzed as well. For this reason I will start by 
repeating and comparing the nature of the conflict cases, then I will proceed with describing the 
characteristics of the disputant parties in both cases and comparing them and finally I will focus 
on the mediator itself and show its characteristics and strategies in both parties. In this way I 
will be able to answer the research question on the role of religious organizations in conflict 
mediation.  
Nature of the conflict 
The nature of the conflict in Mozambique differs greatly from that in Kosovo. Mozambique 
had been in civil war for fifteen years. When FRELIMO liberated the country from the 
Portuguese in 1975 they ruled Mozambique according to scientific socialist principles. Soon 
RENAMO started to oppose the FRELIMO government, backed by the Rhodesian and South 
African government. The conflict escalated leading up to over 2 million refugees and countless 
attacks on civilian targets. In the late 1980s it slowly became clear to both parties that no side 
could win the war. The conflict seemed ripe to end, but there were a lot of complicating factors. 
The government did not want to recognize RENAMO as an official partner so only wanted 
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mediation if provided by local religious leaders. RENAMO on the other hand wanted a powerful 
international mediator to lead the talks. Sant’Egidio, which had been involved in Mozambique 
for several years now, set up direct talks between the two parties assisted by the archbishop of 
Beira Jaime Goncalves and the Italian government. At first this small group led the preliminary 
talks, but later got promoted to official mediators. With the help of other international actors a 
peace agreement was brokered which turned out to be durable. 
Kosovo has been an area of conflict for centuries because of its border location. From the 
fourteenth century a mix of Albanian Muslims and Serbian Orthodox Christians have been living 
in Kosovo alternately ruled by a Serbian or Albanian/Ottoman government. When Milošević 
came to power both Serbian and Albanian nationalism rose creating both ethnic and religious 
tensions. The Serbian government implemented Serbian curricula which was obligated for all 
schools, making education in the Albanian language forbidden. This resulted in the setting up of 
a parallel school system where the level was very low and secondary education was scarce. 
Sant’Egidio mediated an agreement after they came into contact with leaders from both parties.  
The Kosovo conflict mainly differs from the Mozambican conflict regarding the ethnic and 
religious dimension of the conflicts. In Mozambique support for the FRELIMO government or 
RENAMO rebels showed some correlation with the different tribes of the country but the 
division between the groups was not nearly as high as in Kosovo. In Kosovo the Serbian and 
Albanian population were separated on multiple levels. Both their ethnicity and religion were 
different and the existence of a shadow government separated the people on almost all levels in 
society. This made the conflict in Kosovo deeply rooted on a social and societal level and  this 
was a highly complicating factor to ending the conflict.  
Apart from that another large difference between the two conflicts is to what extent the 
conflict was ripe to end. As explained before, in Mozambique both parties were ready to end the 
conflict. No side was able to win the conflict using violence or other tactics so both parties were 
willing to start a peace process. In Kosovo the conflict was not ripe to end since neither of the 
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parties was prepared to compromise on their authority over the area. The Serbian government 
wanted to keep control over Kosovo whereas Rugova and his shadow government wanted 
independence for Kosovo. Since the topic of the rule over Kosovo could not be discussed, the 
negotiations focused only on the education subject. An agreement was reached, but from 
hindsight both leaders could have used these talks for their own political agenda instead of 
looking for solutions for the conflict. Not only was the general conflict ‘unripe’, the conflict 
regarding the education as well shown by the lack of effort that was put into the implementation 
of the agreement.  
Characteristics of disputant parties 
The cases of Mozambique and Kosovo are comparable regarding the characteristics of the 
disputant parties. In Mozambique the conflict was between the government formed of FRELIMO 
members and its violent opposition RENAMO. Both parties were supported by powerful 
international actors which gave them the resources to continue the war. The leaders of both 
parties had been in place for a while already, so the beginning of the peace talks did not have 
anything to do with a regime change. Although both parties were willing to stop the violence and 
end the civil war there were some concerns for both parties which complicated the peace 
process. FRELIMO did not want to recognize RENAMO as an official partner by starting formal 
peace negotiations with them. RENAMO on the other hand did not want to conform to the 
requirements of the government and only wanted to start a peace process if it were to be 
mediated by a powerful international actor or a neighboring state with a positive attitude 
towards RENAMO.  In Kosovo the profile of the parties and their relation towards one another  
was somewhat similar to the Mozambican case. The Serbian government led by Slobodan  
Milošević constituted one party in the Kosovar conflict and the education issue in particular. 
Milošević had been in power since 1989 and put severe constrictions on the Albanian population 
of Kosovo and its education system. The government of the independent Republic of Kosova 
formed the other party. This unrecognized government, led by Ibrahim Rugova, implemented a 
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parallel system in Kosovo which included a parallel school system. By starting the negotiations 
the parties faced the same difficulties as the Mozambican parties had. The Serbian government 
did not want to recognize the shadow government of Rugova as an official mediation partner 
with authority over Kosovo, whereas Rugova’s shadow government did not want to recognize 
the Serbian government as having authority over Kosovo.  
In contrast to the similarity between both cases in the official position of the two disputant 
parties, there is a big difference in the party’s attitude towards peace. In Mozambique it is clear 
that both parties were willing to end the war and start a peace process to accomplish this. Even 
though this brought along other problems and the process did not go smoothly at all times, this 
willingness to make peace was an important factor for the achievement of it. By contrast, in 
Kosovo both parties were not aiming to achieve peace. It can even be argued that they both were 
using the negotiations for their own political gain.  
Concluding, in both conflicts there were two conflicting parties with one being the official 
government and the other one the opposition to this government. This led to similar problems in 
the mediation process. The attitude towards peace of the disputant parties forms a great 
contrast between the cases with both factions in Mozambique wanting to achieve peace and both 
factions in Kosovo wanting to continue the combat for autonomy.  
Characteristics of the mediator: Motivation, leverage, bias and resources 
The characteristics of the mediator are the same in both cases. This is partly caused by the 
short time that passed between the two mediation processes. The peace negotiations in 
Mozambique were held between 1990 and 1992 and the negotiations regarding education in 
Kosovo were held in 1995 and 1996. Unfortunately it was not possible to track down which 
members of the Community of Sant’Egidio were the mediators in Kosovo, but because of the 
complexity of mediation it can be presumed that they send the people who were already 
experienced by involvement in Mozambique. The characteristics of the mediator which have 
 
51 
been proven to have an effect on the outcome of the mediation process have been sufficiently 
discussed in the previous chapter so will only be shortly restated.  
The Community of Sant’Egidio is motivated by their spiritual belief and humanitarian 
incentives. They have nothing to gain from mediating conflicts apart from helping the affected 
population. Sant’Egidio stated multiple times that they believe war is the mother of poverty and  
that as long as conflicts continue, poverty will continue. Sant’Egidio got involved in Mozambique 
through a close contact and started the mediation process without any previous experience. 
Their role in Mozambique attracted worldwide attention and soon Sant’Egidio was asked to 
mediate in multiple other conflicts through their international members and contacts 
(Sant’Egidio).  Concluding, Sant’Egidio is active in peace making and mediation driven by a 
spiritual and humanitarian motivation. 
It is difficult to thoroughly assess the leverage that Sant’Egidio has as a mediator. Leverage 
is defined as “the power or ability to act or to influence people, events, decisions, etc.”2. 
Sant’Egidio definitely has the power to act and influence people, proven by the agreements that 
followed after the mediation process in both cases. This leverage does not come from the 
traditional type of power that large international actors possess. Also, this leverage is not 
spiritual. In none of the cases is Sant’Egidio viewed as a kind of spiritual religious leader. I 
believe that the leverage that Sant’Egidio has over the disputant parties is their strive for peace 
and trustworthiness. Multiple sources state that the fact that the disputant parties trusted 
Sant’Egidio to mediate the conflict had an important contribution to its positive outcome. 
Bias is a heavily debated topic in the literature on mediation. It is unclear whether a biased 
or an unbiased mediator has a better effect on the outcome of the mediation. Again, it is difficult 
to analyze the degree of bias of Sant’Egidio in both cases. In Mozambique it can be assumed that 
there was no bias. Sant’Egidio had no connection to either RENAMO or FRELIMO since it became 
involved in Mozambique through an outsider. Moreover, the religious dimension was of no 
                                                          
2
 From the website http://dictionary.reference.com. Retrieved at 05/06/2014 
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importance in this conflict so that is no reason for bias towards one party as well. Also, no 
mention is made in the literature of biased behavior so there is no reason to assume bias of 
Sant’Egidio in favor of one of the parties in Mozambique. In the case of Kosovo it is a little more 
complicated. Since religion is an important dimension in the conflict, it could be argued that 
Sant’Egidio, being a catholic community, would be biased in favor of the Christian party. On the 
contrary, statements on the website of Sant’Egidio provide hints of bias towards the other party. 
Sant’Egidio mentions their “friendship with Rugova” as the reason for getting involved in Kosovo 
and the non-violent approach of Rugova as “the only road which could be traveled in a high-
tension situation”. Furthermore their objective was to help the Albanian children to return to 
school, which could imply a bias towards this side of the conflict (Sant’Egidio). On the other hand, 
the literature on the negotiations held in Kosovo and Sant’Egidio’s role in it mention nothing 
about a possible bias of the mediator. Therefore there is no definitive reason to assume 
Sant’Egidio was biased in either of the cases.  
The resources a mediator can bring to the process are variable. Resources can entail 
money, property, location, time and people. Sant’Egidio has a sufficient but not exorbitant 
amount of everything.  Regarding money Sant’Egidio needed assistance from other partners to 
finance the mediation process, but they have enough to keep themselves running the 
organization. The headquarters of Sant’Egidio in Rome provided the venue for the negotiations 
in both cases. Most importantly, Sant’Egidio had sufficient capable people to offer who had 
enough time on their hands to mediate the conflicts. 
Outcome 
To conclude anything about the role of religious organizations in conflict mediation  the 
outcome of the negotiation process needs to be analyzed. In the beginning of this chapter it has 
been explained how a successful outcome will be measured. The first possible successful 
outcome is  the starting of a dialogue, which has been achieved in both cases. The second stage of 
success is defined as the stop of urgent problems, violence in the Mozambican case and the 
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return of Albanian children to school in Kosovo, which has only been achieved in Mozambique. 
The third stage of a successful outcome is the reaching of a formal agreement. This happened in 
Mozambique (Annex A) without doubt, but the agreement reached Kosovo is more ambiguous. 
There was an official agreement reached and signed, but this Education Agreement is very short, 
general and vague. Moreover it was not implemented so did not seem sustainable in contrast to 
the successful peace agreement reached in Mozambique.  
Conclusion 
It is not possible to completely answer the research question regarding the role of 
religious organizations in conflict mediation. Some important insights have been reached 
however. By analyzing the behavior of a religious organization, Sant’Egidio, along seven different 
factors in two different cases and linking that to the outcome of the mediation process the 
following can be concluded. In the two cases that have been researched Sant’Egidio’s efforts 
have had a positive effect on the outcome of the mediation process.  
In Mozambique the work of Sant’Egidio as being a part of the official mediation team, 
being available for mediating direct talks between the parties, going back and forth to 
Mozambique for individual talks and setting up different agreements proved successful. 
Moreover, Sant’Egidio’s headquarters in Rome provided a neutral venue for the talks to be held. 
Aside from the qualities of Sant’Egidio, the positive outcome of the Mozambican peace talks is 
owed to its international contacts. The financial support of the Italian government and 
experience and advice from members of the US and UN, as well as the support of individual 
states with the implementation process proved important contributions to the peace making 
process. When the nature of the conflict is analyzed, one could say the conflict was ripe to end. 
Both parties were willing to end the war, so difficulties were more in the smaller aspect of the 
peacemaking process. The most important aspects were political and regarded the question of 
who should mediate the negotiations and to what extent the parties should recognize each 
other’s authority. Even though there were some setbacks, both FRELIMO and RENAMO were 
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motivated to end the war and continue the peace organizations. The representatives of 
Sant’Egidio proved, together with Goncalves and Raffaelli, a trustworthy mediation team. They 
had sufficient resources, were unbiased and were truly motivated to end the war. Moreover, the 
mediation team made use of a combination of facilitative and formulative strategies, and hereby 
avoided the pitfall of pressuring disputant parties into a peace it does not support. The lack of 
leverage also proves that the peace agreement reached was not caused by manipulation from 
external actors but rather formed by the parties themselves. The combination of all these factors 
made Sant’Egidio a trustworthy partner, which was very important for both parties. Even 
though it cannot be claimed that the role of Sant’Egidio in ending Mozambique’s war was 
indispensible, it at the least proved very valuable. Sant’Egidio’s efforts, strategy and 
characteristics in combination with its international contacts were the perfect formula for 
starting a dialogue, ending violence and ultimately an official peace agreement which proved 
sustainable.  
In the negotiations with regard to the education system in Kosovo, Sant’Egidio played a 
very influential role as well. The Community established direct contact between Rugova’s KDL 
and the Serbian President Milosevic. Aside from that, they hosted negotiations in their 
headquarters. The negotiations about the schooling issue in Kosovo formed the first time there 
were direct talks between the Albanians and the Serbs in the twentieth century. Direct talks 
were established and an agreement was signed, nevertheless the implementation was not 
completed and the conflict escalated soon afterwards. When analyzing the nature of the conflict 
it becomes clear that the ethnic and religious dimension is immense, which means that the 
division is deeply rooted in society and a solution is more difficult to achieve. More importantly, 
the leaders of both sides were not ready for peace or even to definitely end the education 
problem. The role of Sant’Egidio in Kosovo’s conflict is less of an obvious success than in 
Mozambique, but the starting of dialogue and signing of an agreement seemed very promising at 
the time. Sant’Egidio again had a lack of leverage, but sufficient resources and a strong 
motivation. It cannot be ruled out that Sant’Egidio was biased towards the Albanian, but since no 
 
55 
others sources than Sant’Egidio’s website point towards a favorability towards one party it can 
be assumed that it did not play a big role in the negotiations. Using various facilitative strategies 
they established a direct dialogue between the two parties.  Again, the trustworthiness of 
Sant’Egidio is praised in the literature as its biggest asset. Both parties wanted to avoid officially 
recognizing each other’s authority over Kosovo so a non-state actor like Sant’Egidio allowed 
contact and negotiations on a more informal level. Even though the agreement reached did not 
turn out to be durable, the efforts, characteristics and strategies of Sant’Egidio established the 
first dialogue between the two parties. 
The two cases where Sant’Egidio mediated negotiations between two disputant parties 
that have been analyzed show some similarities and some differences. The most important 
similarity is the relation between the disputant parties. Both conflicts included one 
governmental party and one domestic opposition party. In both cases the recognition of the 
other party as an official mediation partner formed a large obstacle. Both governments preferred 
an informal or domestic mediator to keep the negotiations as informal and unofficial as possible. 
Another important similarity is the time in which the negotiations were held since both 
happened in the 1990s. Also, in both cases representatives of Sant’Egidio formed either a large 
part of the mediation team or were the only mediators. They had the same humanitarian 
motivation, had the same amount of leverage and resources, and used more or less the same 
strategies. The nature of the conflict forms the greatest difference between the two cases. Where 
in Mozambique there was a clear willingness to end the conflict, in Kosovo both parties only 
used the negotiations for their own political gain. This explains the difference in outcome. Even 
though representatives of Sant’Egidio managed to create a dialogue and direct talks in both 
cases, only in Mozambique the brokered deal lasted. This proves that even though the 
characteristics of the mediator are a good match with the conflict, the disputant parties have to 
be willing to make the brokered deal lasting.  
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Even though the insights gained in this analysis are helpful in the research field of conflict 
mediation, a lot more needs to be done to fully answer the research question. Some cases 
mediated by Sant’Egidio could be added, but asides from that it is important to analyze other 
religious organizations active in conflict mediation. The Vatican and the Quackers are useful 
examples of what could be added to the research on conflict mediation by religious 
organizations. For now it can be concluded that the biggest asset of religious organizations, what 
sets them apart from other mediators, is their trustworthiness. Multiple sources stress the 
important of Sant’Egidio being a mediator without further agenda or a chance for personal gain. 
Religious organizations are strongly motivated to help the suffering population and create peace 
from a spiritual perspective. 
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Appendix A 
 
General Peace Agreement for Mozambique -  04/10/1992 
Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique and Afonso Macacho 
Marceta Dhlakama, President of Renamo, meeting at Rome, under the chairmanship of the 
Italian Government, in the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Italian Republic, 
Emílio Colombo, and in the presence of: 
H.E. Robert Gabriel Mugabe, President of the Republic of Zimbabwe; 
H.E. Ketumile Masire, President of the Republic of Botswana: 
H.E. George Saitoti, Vice-President of the Republic of Kenya; 
H.E. Roelof F. Botha, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa: 
The Hon. John Tembo, Minister in the Office of the President of the Republic of Malawi; 
Ambassador Ahmed Haggag, Assistant Secretary-General of OAU: 
And of the mediators: Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Italian Government and co-
ordinator of the mediators, Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, Andrea Riccardi and 
Matteo Zuppi of the Community of Sant’ Egidio; 
And representatives of the observers: Dr. James O. C. Jonah, Under-Secretary-General for 
Political Affairs of the United Nations; H.E. Ambassador Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary 
of State, for the Government of the United States of America; H.E. Ambassador Philippe 
Cuvillier for the Government of France: H.E. Dr. José Manuel Durão Barroso, Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, for the Government of Portugal: and H.E. Sir Patrick Fairweather for 
the Government of the United Kingdom: 
At the conclusion of the negotiating process in Rome for the establishment of a lasting peace 
and effective democracy in Mozambique, accept as binding the following documents which 
constitute the General Peace Agreement: 
1. Protocol I (Basic principles); 
2. Protocol II (Criteria and arrangements for the formation and recognition of political 
parties): 
3. Protocol III (Principles of the Electoral Act); 
4. Protocol IV (Military questions); 
5. Protocol V (Guarantees); 
6. Protocol VI (Cease-fire); 
7. Protocol VII (Donors’ Conference). 
They also accept as integral parts of the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique the 
following documents: 
(a) The Joint Communiqué of 10 July 1990; 
(b) The Agreement of 1 December 1990; 
(c) The Declaration of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and Renamo on 
guiding principles for humanitarian assistance, signed in Rome on 16 July 1992; 
(d) The Joint Declaration signed in Rome on 7 August 1992. 
The President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of Renamo undertake to do 
everything within their power for the achievement of genuine national reconciliation. 
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The above-mentioned Protocols have been duly initialed and signed by the respective heads 
of delegation and by the mediators. The present General Peace Agreement shall enter into 
force immediately upon its signature. 
Joaquim Alberto Chissano 
President of the Republic of Mozambique 
Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama 
President of Renamo 
The mediators: 
Mario Raffaelli, Jaime Gonçalves, Andrea Riccardi, Matteo Zuppi 
Signed at Rome on 4 October 1992. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
STATEMENT -  01/09/1996 
 
Since some years now, the educational system of Kosovo - from elementary schooling to 
university - does not work in a normal way.  
By mutual consent the undersigned, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Republic of 
Serbia and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova have decided to proceed to the normalisation of the 
educational system of Kosovo for Albanian youth (at all levels). 
On this line the agreement reached foresees the retum of the Albanian students and teachers 
back to schools (and Faculties). 
The present agreement, because of its social and humanitarian value, takes its place bey'ond 
political debate. Thc concern for the future of the Albanian youth of Kosovo, a concern that 
both undersigned feel very strongly, has lead them to reach such an agreement.  
Both undersigned thank their joint friends of the Community of S. Egidio for the generous 
commitment and the valid help and support they have given to dialogue.  
Both undersigned are furthermore certain about the commitment of all those who are in 
charge in the implementation of the agreement for the normalisation of the educa- tional 
system. There wil1 be a mixed group (3+3) established for the realisation of this agreement.  
When young people do commit themselves with serenity to their cu1tural formation so to 
become responsible citizens, we face a victory of civilisation itself, not the victory of one side 
on the other.  
  
Prishtina, September 1, 1996  
Dr. Ibrahim Rugova  
Belgrade, September 1, 1996 
Mr. Slobodan Milosevic 
President of the Republic of Serbia 
 
